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Jurisdiction: The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a). 
Statement of the issue: I established good cause with the Department of 
Workforce Services for leaving my place of employment by showing that 
staying on would have created sufficient hardship to make it necessary for 
me to quit or that I had no reasonable alternative to quitting. 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, and rules: 
(Utah Administrative Code R994-405) 
To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the 
employment would have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could 
not control or prevent. The claimant must show that an immediate severance 
of the employment relationship was necessary. 
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant. 
(a) Hardship. 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the 
continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently 
adverse to a reasonable person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining 
employed. There must have been actual or potential physical, mental, 
economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by the 
employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the 
actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive. 
(b) Ability to control or prevent. 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good 
cause will not be found if the claimant: 
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(i) reasonably could have continued working while looking for 
other employment, 
(ii) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to 
preserve the job like using approved leave, transferring, or 
making adjustments to personal circumstances, or, 
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing 
the hardship thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity 
to make changes that would eliminate the need to quit. An 
employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to 
work out the differences with the employer before quitting 
unless those efforts would have been futile. 
Statement of the case: 
The initial denial of my unemployment claim by the Department of 
Workforce Services on May 29,2008 was based on the caseworker's 
perception that I voluntarily left my place of employment and that I did not 
establish good cause for leaving by showing that staying on would have 
created sufficient hardship to make it necessary for me to quit or that I had 
no reasonable alternative to quitting (pg. 19 of record index #08-R-00433). 
Based on the findings of fact from the June 26, 2008 telephone hearing, 
Administrative Law Judge Amanda McPeck reversed that decision. She 
concluded that the employer was the moving party in my termination and 
that none of the factors of just cause had been met in regard to my dismissal 
(pp. 92, 93, & 94 of record index #08-R-00433). 
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A subsequent decision of the Workforce Appeals Board reversed the 
decision of Judge McPeck and supported the initial decision of the 
caseworker (pg. 107 of record index #08-R-00433). 
In reply to the respondents' brief, I would like to point out a number 
of inaccuracies that are apparent in their statement of the facts and support 
for their arguments. Those are as follows; 1) that my physical limitations 
were the primary reason for my reassignment from the Bear Lake location, 
2) that I asked to be assigned back to that location after being reassigned 
other job responsibilities, 3) that I verbalized not being a good fit for the 
agency and wanting to terminate my employment in a telephone 
conversation with Todd Barson, the deputy director of Bear River Health 
Department (BRHD), the day before my termination 4) that I was the 
moving party in my termination; 5) that I did not show good cause for 
leaving my place of employment; and 6) that I did not attempt to explore 
other options prior to being terminated. 
Relevant facts, summary, and detail: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has indicated in their brief that I was 
physically unable to climb the stairs at my assigned worksite in Bear Lake 
and that I was, therefore, reassigned to the 4-hour blocks of group therapy in 
the Logan office and at the jail. That was not the main reason for my 
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reassignment. For 3 months I had successfully fulfilled my work 
responsibilities with the Bear Lake clientele, either at a health clinic in 
Garden City, which was well-trafficked by other healthcare professionals, or 
at my office location in Logan. It was only within the last 2 weeks of my 
employment with BRHD that my employer chose to relocate to a new 
Garden City office location. The new location was a small, isolated office 
which was located above a real estate agency and which was only accessible 
by a steep and narrow stairway on the outside of the building. My primary 
concern about the new office location was that I was to be left entirely alone 
on the upper floor of that building with my clients, who were all convicted 
male substance offenders (pp. 12 & 58 of record index #08-R-00433). Even 
the onsite psychologist at the health department, Dr. Trent Wentz, referred to 
that situation as being not only a safety issue for me but also a liability issue 
for my employer. My secondary concern was that I discovered that 
attempting to climb those steep and narrow stairs aggravated a prior knee 
condition (pp. 12 & 58 of record index #08-R-00433). My first suggested 
solution to the problem, for my husband to be allowed to follow me to Bear 
Lake, assist me up the stairs, and sit in the conference room while I met with 
my clients, was disallowed by my supervisor, Mr. Brock Alder. However, a 
signed consent form from the clients would have made that situation quite 
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feasible. Another potential solution that I thought of was to contact the 
owner of a home-healthcare business that utilized an office located directly 
adjacent to mine and to request that she allow me to coordinate my schedule 
with hers so that perhaps a member of her staff could be present in her office 
while I met with my clients. Mr. Alder and Mr. Barson also disallowed that 
suggestion. Their solution was to reassign me. 
The Workforce Appeals Board has also reiterated a mistaken 
inference that I asked to be assigned back to Bear Lake following my 
reassignment to the 4-hour blocks of group. That was never the case. When 
I began teaching the groups, Tracy Sorensen, a male therapist, started seeing 
my former clients in Bear Lake. I made no request to be removed from the 
Bear Lake assignment and subsequently made no request to be reassigned. 
The Workforce Appeals Board also indicated that Mr. Barson asked 
on the day before my discharge if I still felt I was not a good fit for the 
agency and if I wanted to terminate my employment. In his own testimony 
before Judge McPeck, Mr. Barson indicated not having asked but having 
told me those things and even having suggested a specific termination date 
(pp. 55, 56, & 61 of record index #08-R-00433). Judge McPeck rightly 
determined that made him the moving party in my termination (pp. 92,93, & 
94 of record index #08-R-00433). She also determined he had insufficient 
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cause for discharging me based on Mr. Alder's testimony that none of his 
complaints against me were of sufficient severity for termination and that no 
corrective action had been taken (pg. 69 of record index #08-R-00433). 
The Workforce Appeals Board stated it was my decision to terminate 
my employment. I only agreed to the termination date of May 2nd because 
no accommodation was offered in response to my inquiry in regard to the 4-
hour blocks of group therapy to which I was assigned after being removed 
from the Bear Lake assignment. Those groups were too fatiguing for me to 
conduct on my own in light of a bone condition that I was diagnosed with in 
September of 2007. While I have experienced pain and fatigue related to my 
condition since the time of my diagnosis, it was only within the last 2 weeks 
of my employment with BRHD that I was assigned a task that was beyond 
my ability to perform. 
The Workforce Appeals Board has suggested that I failed to show 
good cause for quitting because I subsequently asked to remain employed 
long enough to meet with my physician to see if something could be done to 
remedy my pain and fatigue. I was only trying to attempt, as any reasonable 
person would, to salvage my work opportunity. I truly hoped that something 
might be done to make that possible. However, I would have had to meet 
with my physician immediately in order to develop a solution to my pain and 
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fatigue, and the employer made that impossible. Nor did I have paid 
medical leave that could be taken before mid-July. 
The Workforce Appeals Board also mentioned that I did not choose to 
explore other options besides termination prior to leaving my place of 
employment. That is untrue. I was in the very act of asking to explore some 
potential accommodations when Mr. Barson requested my resignation and 
suggested that I work my last day on May 2nd. As I have mentioned before, 
I was told that no accommodation could be afforded due to the nature of my 
job. However, it was the employer who changed the nature of my job, and I 
knew of at least four other therapists on my team who were not leading the 
4-hour blocks of group during my tenure at BRHD. Any one of them could 
have traded work assignments with me or perhaps could have co-led my 
groups with me in order to allow me an occasional respite during our session 
time together. I know I was not the only therapist to desire such an 
arrangement. 
Conclusion: 
I am again requesting that my unemployment benefits be reinstated 
for the weeks during which I submitted my weekly claims. I am basing my 
request on the errors inherent in the respondents' statement of facts and 
expressed arguments. In addition, it was in no way unreasonable or 
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infeasible for my employer to have offered an accommodation for either the 
Bear Lake assignment or the 4-hour blocks of group. As stated, I never 
asked to be removed from Bear Lake and developed multiple solutions in an 
attempt to stay. I was equally willing to brainstorm options for the groups. 
Finally, the appeals board, while having much authority in matters 
pertaining to the law, does not have the expertise to comment on my medical 
condition or to overlook the opinion of my physician. I would also like to 
remind the court that no complaints about my job performance were brought 
to my attention prior to a couple of weeks before my termination (most of 
them only 2 days before) and that I expressed a willingness to address those. 
No addendum is required. 
Thank you for your consideration of my unemployment claim. 
Mary L. iSeager ' 
Petitioner 
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